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Editor's note: Over the years, critics of the
exclusionary rule have called it, among other
things, an "illogical," "irrational," and "un-
natural" interpretation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Last fall, for example, U.S. Court of Ap-
peals Judge Malcolm Wilkey, writing in the
Wall Street Journal, said the rule "is not
required by the Constitution .... The exclu-
sionary rule is a judge-made rule of evidence
which bars 'the use of evidence secured
through an illegal search and seizure.'...
The only excuse offered for this irrational
rule is that there is 'no effective alternative'
to make the police obey the law."
In an effort to explore this controversial
question further, Judicature invited Judge
Wilkey and a defender of the rule, Yale
Kamisar, to express their views. Judge Wil-
key will explain his opposition and suggest
alternatives to the rule in a later issue.
M ore than 50 years have passed since
the Supreme Court decided the Weeks
case,' barring the use in federal prosecutions
of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and the Silverthorne
case,2 invoking what has come to be known
as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine.3 The justices who decided those cases
would, I think, be quite surprised to learn
that some day the value of the exclusionary
rule would be measured by-and the very
life of the rule might depend on-an empiri-
cal evaluation of its efficacy in deterring
police misconduct.
4
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2.: Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920)
3. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939),
refusing to allow the prosecution to avoid an inquiry
into its use of information gained by illegal wiretap-
ping, first used the phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree."
See generally Pitler, 'The Fruit of the Poisonous Tred
Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579
(1968).
4. Space does not permit an extensive evaluation of
the recent "empirical studies" of the exclusionary rule's
effects (if any) on police behavior. But see "Does the
exclusionary rule affect police behavior?" on page 70 of
this issue.
These justices were engaged in a less
ambitious venture, albeit a most important
one. They were interpreting the Fourth
Amendment as best they could. As they saw
it, the rule-now known as the federal exclu-
sionary rule-rested on "a principled basis
rather than an empirical proposition." 5
The dissenters in United States v. Caland-
ra were, I think, plainly right when they
maintained that "uppermost in the minds of
the framers of the [exclusionary] rule" was
not "the rule's possible deterrent effect," but
"the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to
avoid the taint of partnership in official
lawlessness and of assuring the people [that]
the government would not profit from its
lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk
of seriously undermining popular trust in
government.''6 The main purpose of this
article, then, is to trace, explain and justify
the original grounding of the exclusionary
rule-what has come to be known as "the
imperative of judicial intergrity. "7
The Weeks opinion
As Professor Francis Allen recently remind-
ed us, the Weeks opinion "contains no lan-
guage that expressly justifies the rule by
reference to a supposed deterrent effect on
5. Cf. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice:
The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U.
ILL.L.F. 518, 536-37 (pointing out that, unlike the
Court's understanding in the formative phases of the
exclusionary rule's history, in recent years the deterrent
function has prevailed as its predominant justification,
and that "until the rule rests on [returns to?] a princi-
pled basis rather than an empirical proposition," Mapp
"will remain in a state of unstable equilibrium").
6. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 388, 357
(1974) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall,
JJ., dissenting). Calandra held that a grand jury witness
may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that
they are based on evidence obtained from him by
violating the Fourth Amendment. See also, Schrock and
Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Requiremen4 59 MINN. L. REV. 251
(1974).
7. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)
(Stewart, J.) (overturning the "silver platter" doctrine),
quoted with approval in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
656 (1961) (Clark, J.) (imposing the exclusionary rule as
to unconstitutionally seized materials on state courts as
a matter of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process). See
also United States v. Calandra, supra n. 6.
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police officials."" Indeed, in the United
States Supreme Court, some 35 years were to
pass, as Professor Robert McKay has noted,
before Wolf v. Coloradoa "introduced the
notion of deterrence of official illegality to
the debate concerning the wisdom of the
exclusionary rule."o
As the Weeks justices saw it, if a court
could not "sanction" a search or seizure
before the event-because, for example, the
police lacked sufficient cause to make the
search or were unable to describe the item(s)
they sought with the requisite particular-
ity-then a court could not, or at least should
not, "affirm" or "sanction" the search or
seizure after the event.
The courts, after all, are the specific ad-
dressees of the constitutional command that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon" certain
prescribed conditions. If "not even an order
of court would have justified" the police
action, as it would not have had in Weeks,
then "much less was it within [the officers']
authority" to proceed on their own "to bring
further proof [of guilt] to' the aid of the
Government." And if the government's
agents did proceed on their own, "without
sanction of law," then the government
should not be permitted to use what their
agents obtained. The government whose
agents violated the Constitution should be
in no better position than the government
whose agents obeyed it; "the efforts of the
courts and their officials to bring the guilty
to punishment ... are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of [Fourth Amendment] princi-
ples." Is any of this really so hard to follow?
Since so many commentators lately have
emphasized the efficacy (or inefficacy) of the
exclusionary rule in preventing illegal
searches and seizures," it may be profitable
to take a fresh look at the key passages in the
old Weeks case:
... The tendency of those who execute the crimi-
nal laws [to] obtain convictions by means of
unlawful seizures ... should find no sanction in
8. Id. at 536 n. 90.
9. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
10. McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule
and the Right of Privacy, 15 ARIzoNA L. REV. 327, 330
(1973).
11. See notes 5, 6 and 7 supra.
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the judgments of the courts which are charged at
all times with the support of the Constitution and
to which people of all conditions have a right to
appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights.
...The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment . . . are not to
be aided by the sacrifice of [Fourth Amendment]
principles .... The United States Marshall acted
without sanction of law . . .and under color of
his office undertook to make a seizure of private
papers in direct violation of the constitutional
prohibition against such action .... To sanction
such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect if not an open defi-
ance of the prohibitions of the Constitution,
intended for the protection of the people against
such unauthorized action.1 2
Ratifying illegal searches
Although the Fourth Amendment consti-
tutes a guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it does not, of course,
explicitly state what the consequences of a
violation of the guarantee should be. This
"specific" of the Bill of Rights turns out, as
is so often the case,' 3 not to be specific about
the issue which confronted the Weeks Court
and is the subject of today's debate.
This only means that here as elsewhere-
almost everywhere-the Court "cannot es-
cape the demands of judging or of making
... difficult appraisals."' 14 But what is
wrong with the Weeks Court's appraisal?
Does its reading of the Fourth Amendment
do violence to the language or purpose of the
guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure? Does its interpretation of this con-
stitutional provision require an active imagi-
nation? Is the interpretation strained, illogi-
cal or implausible?
It is plain that Holmes and Brandeis
thought not. In the Silverthome case,
Holmes, joined by Brandeis and five other
justices, observed:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acqui-
sition of evidence in a certain way is that not
12. 232 U.S. at 392-94.
13. See, e.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code
of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929,937,954
(1965); Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Pro-
cess Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE
L.J. 319, 337-39 (1957); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1,
17-18 (1959).
14. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1973)
(Goldberg, J.). See also Friendly, supra n. 13, at 937-38.
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'If the government
becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt
for law.'
-Justice Louis Brandeis
merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court but that it shall not be used at
all. Of course this does not mean that the facts
thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If
knowledge of them is gained from an indepen-
dent source, they may be proved like any others,
but the knowledge gained by the government's
own wrong cannot be used by it in the way
proposed.'
5
The Olmstead case 16 involved two ques-
tions, both answered in the negative by a 5-4
majority: (1) Are telephone messages within
the protection against unreasonable search
and seizure? (2) Even if they are not, should
the evidence nevertheless be excluded be-
cause the federal agents who tapped the
phones thereby violated a state statute?
On the second issue, Chief Justice Wil-
liam Taft, writing for the majority, did not
challenge the Weeks rule, but insisted that
"the exclusion of evidence should be con-
fined to cases [such as Weeks] where rights
under the Constitution would be violated by
admitting it."'17 In dissent, Holmes and
Brandeis argued that "apart from the Consti-
tution the government ought not to use evi-
dence obtained and only obtainable by a
criminal act."' 8 Their arguments as to why
the exclusionary rule should apply to illegal,
as well as unconstitutional, police action are
essentially restatements, although more fa-
mous and most eloquent ones, of the reason-
ing in Weeks.
First, Holmes: 19
If [the government] pays its officers for having
got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may
not as well pay them for getting it in the same
way, and I can attach no importance to protesta-
15. 251 U.S. at 392.
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17. Id. at 468.
18. Id. at 469-70 (dissenting opinion).
19. Id. at 470-71 (dissenting opinion).
tions of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and
pays and announces that in the future it will pay
for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part
I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government would play an
ignoble part.
For those who agree with me, no distinction
can be taken between the government as prosecu-
tion and the government as judge. If the existing
code does not permit district attorneys to have a
hand in such dirty business it does not permit the
judge to allow such inequities to succeed .... I
am aware of the often repeated statement that in a
criminal proceeding the court will not take notice
of the manner in which papers offered in evi-
dence have been obtained. But that somewhat
rudimentary mode of disposing of the question
has been overthrown by Weeks [and] the reason
for excluding evidence obtained by violating the
Constitution seems to me logically to lead to
excluding evidence obtained by a crime of the
officers of the law.
Then Brandeis :
20
When these unlawful acts were committed, they
were crimes only of the officers individually. The
government was innocent, in legal contempla-
tion; for no federal official is authorized to com-
mit a crime on its behalf. When the government,
having full knowledge, sought ... to avail itself
of the fruits of these acts in order to accomplish
its own ends, it assumed moral responsibility for
the officers' crimes .... And if this court should
permit the government by means of its officers'
crimes, to effect its purpose of punishing the
defendant, there would seem to be present all the
elements of a ratification....
Will this court by sustaining the judgment
below sanction such conduct on the part of the
Executive?
... The Court's aid is denied ... in order to
maintain respect for law; in order to promote
confidence in the administration of justice; in
order to preserve the judicial process from
contamination....
Decency, security and liberty alike demand
that government officials shall be subjected to the
same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperilled if it fails to ob-
serve the law scrupulously. Our government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes
a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it in-
vites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy.
Police reaction to Mapp
I never fully appreciated the force of the
20. Id. at 483-85 (dissenting opinion).
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Weeks opinion, and the Holmes-Brandeis
dissents in Olmstead, until some 15 years
ago when an incident occurred in Minnesota
where I was then teaching. It helped me see
the implications of the rule more clearly.
Until 1961, the Minnesota courts, as well
as the courts of about half the states, had
permitted the use of unconstitutionally
seized evidence. But when the Court decid-
ed Mapp v. Ohio in 196 1,21 and imposed the
exclusionary rule on Minnesota and other
"admissibility states" as a matter of federal
constitutional law, it caused much grum-
bling in police ranks.
This led Minnesota's young attorney gen-
eral, Walter Mondale, to remind the police
that "the language of the Fourth Amend-
ment is identical to the [search and seizure
provision] of the Minnesota State Consti-
tution" and that "Mapp did not alter one
word of either the state or national constitu-
tions." 22 The Mapp case, stressed Mondale,
had "not reduce[d] [lawful] police powers
one iota"-"what was a reasonable search
22. Mondale, The Problem of Search and Seizure, 19BENCH & B. OF MINN. 15. 16 (Feb. 1962Y. See alxn
........... OF MIN 15 16 ...... 192 See.....Kamisar, Mondale on Mapp, Feb./Mar. 1977 Civ. LIB.
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). REV. 62.
I
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before, still is." 23
At a subsequent panel discussion on the
law of search and seizure in which I partici-
pated, proponents of the exclusionary rule
quoted Mondale's remarks and made explic-
it what those remarks implied: If the police
feared that evidence they were gathering in
the customary manner would now be ex-
cluded by the courts, the police must have
been violating the guarantee against unrea-
sonable search and seizure all along. This
evoked illuminating responses from the two
law enforcement panelists, responses which
23. Mondale, stipra n. 22, at 16.
KY. L.J. 681, 697-717, 725-27 (1974). See
also, Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of
Civil Liberties Policies at the State and
Federal Levels, 5 AM. POLITICS Q. 57, 71-
75 (1977); D. Horowitz, THE COURTS AND
SOCIAL POLICY 220-54. Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institute, 1976; S. Wasby,
SMALL TOWN POLICE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 25-34, 81-117, 217-29. Lexington,
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1976 (study of
southern Illinois and western Massachusetts
police); cf. Critique, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 740
(1974) a devastating criticism of the Spiotto
study, supra.
For example, Oaks and Spiotto rely on the
high frequency with which motions to sup-
press are granted in Chicago gambling, nar-
cotics and weapons cases to conclude that,
long after adoption of the exclusionary rule,
illegal searches and seizures were common-
place in the enforcement of these offenses by
the Chicago police.
Canon points out that "counting success-
ful motions is an imperfect indicator of the
rule's effectiveness for several reasons," 62
KY. L.J. at 718. He concludes that, in any
event, Chicago is "a gross exception to the
national norm of granting suppression mo-
tions," id. at 721. Canon's study of 65 cities
indicates that in 60 per cent of them motions
to suppress were granted one-tenth of the
time or less and in 91 per cent of the cities
such motions were granted one fourth of the
time or less. Id. at 722.
Moreover, comments Canon, "judges in
I think underscore the need for the "exclu-
sionary rule" and its great symbolic value.
Minneapolis City Attorney Keith Stedd:
I don't think it [is] proper for us to [say that prior
to Mapp the police were violating the law all
along] when the courts of our state were telling
the police all along that the [exclusionary rule]
didn't apply in Minnesota.
St. Paul Detective Ken Anderson:
No officer lied upon the witness stand. If you
were asked how you got your evidence, you told
the truth. You had broken down a door or pried a
window open .. .often we picked locks .... The
Supreme Court of Minnesota sustained this time
after time after time. [The] judiciary okayed it;
Chicago have long been noted for their
willingness to grant motions to suppress
evidence" and "it is sometimes alleged that
Chicago police habitually conduct vice raids
in a manner that ensures that a motion to
suppress will be successful." Id. at 720. As
Wasby explains, supra at 108-17, 217-23,
some judges granted a substantial number of
motions to suppress "during the educational
process" immediately following adoption of
the exclusionary rule, but "police improve-
ment and accommodation to the rules" meant
that after this transitional period few mo-
tions were granted.
To take another example (there are many
in the Canon article), Oaks' study of arrest
before and after Mapp focused on one city,
Cincinnati. He concluded that the adoption
of the exclusionary rule had had virtually no
effect on the number of arrests for narcotics,
weapons and gambling there. See 37 U.
CHI.L.REv. at 707. But Canon gathered sim-
ilar data for 14 cities (including Cincinnati)
and found that only four others had the
"rather minimal response pattern that Cin-
cinnati has." See 62 Ky. L.J. at 706.
At the other end of the spectrum, the
Baltimore decreases in arrests following
Mapp "were both dramatically sudden and
truly spectacular," id. at 704. "Baltimore is
probably an extreme case and is illustrated
to counter Oaks' generalizations about the
efficacy of the exclusionary rule from the
presentation of Cincinnati's arrest figures.
Buffalo is less extreme, but not necessarily
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they knew what the facts were. 24
There is no reason to think that the Min-
nesota experience is unique. The heads of
several police departments also reacted to
the adoption of the exclusionary rule as if
the guarantees against unreasonable search
and seizure had just been written.
For example, shortly after California
adopted the exclusionary rule, 25 William
Parker, then Los Angeles chief of police,
warned that his department's ability to pre-
vent the commission of crime had been
greatly diminished because henceforth his
officers would be unable to take "affirmative
action" unless and until they possessed
"sufficient information to constitute proba-
ble cause." 26 He did promise, however, that
24. Quoted in Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-
Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 COR-
NELL L.Q. 436, 442-43 (1964).
25. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905
(1955).
26. W. Parker, POLICE 117. Springfield, Illinois: C. C.
Thomas, (Wilson ed. 1957).
typical. Indeed, it is not at all clear that there
is a typical response to the exclusionary
rule." Id. at 705.
Canon also noted that political scientist
Michael Ban had concluded, after an in-
depth study of Mapp's impact in Boston and
Cincinnati, that "the Cincinnati political
milieu ... permitted widespread disregard
if not defiance of the Supreme Court's rul-
ing" and that in a number of respects there
was "a discernably lesser propensity for
compliance in Cincinnati than in Boston."
Id. at 689, 698 (Canon's characterization of
Ban's findings, which, though unpublished,
have been widely circulated among political
scientists).
At the present time, there is much to be
said for lawyer-political scientist Donald
Horowitz's analysis of Mapp and police
behavior, Horowitz, supra at 224-25, 230-
31, 250:
Much of the empirical support for the proposi-
tion that Mapp does not deter the police from
violating the Fourth Amendment has been quite
crude .... [T]hat illegal searches are still con-
ducted to obtain evidence of certain kinds of
crimes does not mean that they are still con-
ducted with the same frequency for evidence of
72 Judicature/Volume 62, Number 2/August, 1978
"[a]s long as the Exclusionary Rule is the
law of California, your police will respect it
and operate to the best of their ability within
the framework of limitations imposed by
that rule."27
Similarly, former New York City Police
Commissioner Michael Murphy recalled
how, when Mapp v. Ohio imposed the ex-
clusionary rule on New York and other "ad-
missibility states," he "was immediately
caught up in the entire problem of reevaluat-
ing our procedures ... and modifying,
amending and creating new policies and
new instructions for the implementation of
Mapp. Retraining sessions had to be held
from the very top administrators down to
each of the thousands of foot patrolmen and
detectives engaged in the daily basic en-
forcement function.
'
"
28
Commissioner Murphy, no less than
27. Id. at 131. (Emphasis added).
28. Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in
Law Enforcement: The Problem of Compliance by
Police Departments, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 939, 941 (1966).
other kinds of crimes. That illegal searches are
common in some cities does not mean that they
are equally common in all cities. Deterrence
cannot be viewed as 'a monolithic governmental
enterprise.'
Gradually, the rudiments of a more discrimi-
nating approach have begun to emerge. What it
suggests is that the extent to which police behav-
ior is modified by Mapp depends on a complex
set of local conditions, including ... the type of
offense involved, the particular police unit re-
sponsible for specific enforcement tasks, and the
way in which local c6urts and lawyers handle
search-and-seizure matters. ...
... [T]he fragments indicate it is a mistake to
think that police behavior is never conditioned
by the sanction of excluding evidence that might
lead to conviction .... [Un the case of serious
crimes the policeman starts thinking fairly early
of what is required to convict, and some of the
things he thinks of are the restrictive rules of
arrest and search.
* . . [Cloncern with conviction is very much.a
function of locale, offense, stage of investigation,
and sometimes police unit involved. Receptivity
to the judicial sanction varies accordingly.
In closing these brief remarks, I cannot
resist pointing out that at the same time
some critics of the exclusionary rule are
urging its elimination or substantial modifi-
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Chief Parker, seemed to think that "the
framework of limitations" restraining the
police had been put there by the exclusion-
ary rule, not the state and federal constitu-
tional guarantees against unreasonble search
and seizure. "Flowing from the Mapp case,"
he said, "is the issue of defining probable
cause to constitute a lawful arrest and subse-
quent search and seizure."29
I. Criticisms of the rule
I think it may forcefully be argued that it is
not the exclusionary rule which is illogical
or misdirected, but much of the criticism it
has generated. As Senator Robert Wagner
pointed out in the 1938 New York State
Constitution Convention:
All the arguments [that the exclusionary rule will
handicap law enforcement] seem to me to be
properly directed not against the exclusionary
rule but against the substantive guarantee itself.
S.. It is the [law of search and seizure], not the
sanction, which imposes limits on the operation
29. Id. at 943.
cation on the ground, inter alia, that it has
had little if any effect on police behavior and
little if any impact on the amount of pre-
Mapp illegality, other critics are calling for
the rule's repeal or revision on the ground,
inter alia, that in recent years the police have
attained such a high incidence of compliance
with Fourth Amendment requirements that
"the absolute sanctions of the Exclusionary
Rule are no longer necessary to 'police'
them." Brief of Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement (A.E.L.E.) and the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police (I.A.
C.P.) as Amici Curiai in Support of Petition-
er at 12, California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33
(1972), discussed in Comment, 65 J. CRIM.
L. & C. 373, 383 (1974).
In their amicus brief, the A.E.L.E. and the
I.A.C.P. presented the Court with the results
of a study they had conducted of warrantless
searches and seizures (such searches and
seizures were chosen because these are the
ones "in which the officer is acting on his
own with no assistance from a magistrate or
prosecuting attorney, cases in which his
activity must stand or fall based on his own
judgment, knowledge of search and seizure
of the police. If the rule is obeyed as it should be,
and as we declare it should be, there will be no
illegally obtained evidence to be excluded by the
operation of the sanction.
It seems to me inconsistent to challenge the
exclusionary rule on the ground that it will ham-
per the police, while making no challenge to the
fundamental rules to which the police are re-
quired to conform.30
Cooley said of the Fourth Amendment
110 years ago that "it is better oftentimes
that crime should go unpunished than that
the citizen should be liable to have his
premises invaded, his trunks broken up, [or]
his private books, papers, and letters ex-
posed to prying curiosity."3 1 Why is it no
less true when the accused's premises have
been invaded or his constitutional rights
30. 1 New York Constitutional Convention, Revised
Record 560 (1938), reprinted in J. Michael and H.
Wechsler, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
1191-92. Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, 1940.
See also Traynor, J., in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
450, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
31. T. Cooley, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 306. Boston: Little, Brown, 1st ed. 1868.
restrictions, and his desire to abide by such
restrictions," Brief at 16).
According to this study, of more than 1000
cases involving warrantless searches and
seizures decided by appellate courts nation-
wide during the 27-month period of Janu-
ary, 1970 through March, 1972, 84 per cent
(1,157 of 1,371) were found to be proper-
"an extraordinarily high degree of police
professionalism." Brief at 17.
The amicus brief denies that this study
evidences any beneficial exclusionary rule
influence upon law enforcement, id. at 18,
but I doubt that many will find the denial
convincing. "[T]his excellent record of suc-
cessful police compliance with the riles of
search and seizure," id., is attributed to
"police profess ionalism"-an attempt by
most police to learn "at least in a general
way the restrictions on their search and
seizure activities and a good faith desire to
comport themselves properly within such
restrictions," id. at 19. But what stimulated
the attempt by most officers to familiarize
themselves, at least in a general way, with
the law of search and seizure?
Y.K.
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otherwise violated? If the government could
not have gained a conviction had it obeyed
the Constitution, why should it be permitted
to prevail because it violated the Constitu-
tion?32 And why does it generate so much
popular hostility to disallow the government
to reap an advantage that it secured, and
might only have been able to secure, by
violating the Constitution?
No one, I think, has given a better expla-
nation than Professor John Kaplan, one of
the sharpest critics of the rule:
From a public relations point of view, [tie exclu-
sionary rule] is the worst possible kind of rule
because it only works at the behest of a person,
usually someone who is clearly guilty, who is
attempting to prevent the use against himself of
evidence of his own crimes .... [But the] fact is
that any rule which actually enforced the de-
mands of the Fourth Amendment (whatever they
may be) would prevent the conviction of those
who would be caught through evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Aiendnent. The prob-
lem with the exclusionary rule is that it works
after the fact, so that by then we know who the
criminal is, the evidence against him, and the
other circumstances of the case. If there were
some way to make the police obey, in advance,
the commands of the Fourth Amendment, we
would lose at least as many criminal convictions
as we do today, but in that case we would not
know of the evidence which the police could
discover only through a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. It is possible that the real problem
with the exclusionary rule is that it flaunts before
us the price we pay for the Fourth Amendment.33
The 'time lag' argument
The federal exclusionary rule has been dis-
paraged on the ground that "it was not
adopted by the United States Supreme Court
until 1914" and that despite the possibility
that "an interpretation first made 125 years
[actually 123] after a constitutional provi-
sion might nonetheless be an appropriate
one, the time lag between the adoption of
32. See Allen, Federalism and The Fourth Amend-
ment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 34;
Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L.
REV. 11, 25 (1925). True, in a goodly number of cases
the government might still have obtained a conviction
even if it had obeyedthe Constitution, but critics of the
exclusionary rule would allow the conviction to stand
even if it could have been secured only by violating the
Constitution.
33. J. Kaplan, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 215-16. Mineola,
New York: The Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1978.
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the fourth amendment and the first appear-
ance of the exclusionary rule is at least some
indication that it was hardly basic to the
constitutional purpose." 34 This does not
strike me as much of an argument.
Some 160 years after the adoption of the
First Amendment, the "prevention and pun-
ishment" of "the lewd and obscene, the pro-
fane [and] the libelous" were still thought
to raise no constitutional problens. 35 In-
deed, 128 years passed between the adop-
tion of the First Amendment and the first
articulation of the "clear and present dan-
ger" test 36-what may fairly be called "the
34. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1030-31 (1974). As Dean Griswold
has pointed out in SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA
OF THE SUPREME COURT 2. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1975, "except for the Boydcase [Boyd
v. U.S. 116 U.S. 616 (1886), virtually no search and
seizure cases were decided by the Supreme Court in the
first 110 years of our existence under the Constitution."
The view that illegally seized evidence should be
excluded was first laid down by way of dictim in Boyd,
which went to great lengths to assert a connection
between the Fourth Amendment and the privilege
against self-incrimination, though the case could have
been decided on the self-incrimination clause alone.
Adans v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1903), appeared, by
dictum, to repudiate the Boyd dictum. Thus the exclu-
sionary rule was adopted in Weeks "following an
earlier and seemingly inconsistent start." Reynard,
Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A
Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 IND.L.J. 259,
306-07 (1950). See generally Atkinson, supra n. 32, at
13-17; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
HARV. L.REv. 361, 366-72 (1921); Notes, 56 YALE L.J.
1076, 1077-78 n. 11 (1947); 58 YALE L.J. 144, 148-51
(1948).
Professor Kaplan also observes, 26 STAN. L.REV. at
1031, that "the exclusionary rule was'not imposed upon
the states until 1961, and then by a divided Supreme
Court." But the Supreme Court never addressed the
issue until 1949 in Wolf and that decision was also by a
divided Court (6-3). Over the years, of course, Weeks
and Mapp have caught heavy criticism but so, it should
be remembered, did Wolf, See A. Beisel, CONTROL
OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW: ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 55-59. Boston:
Boston University Press, 1955; Allen, The Wolf Case:
Search and Seizure, Federalism, and Civil Liberties, 45
ILL.L.REv. 1 (1950); Frank, The United States Supreme
Court: 1948-49, 17 U.CEII.L.REv. 1, 32-34 (1950); Kam-
isar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State
Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN.L.REv.
1083 (1959); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search
and Seizure, 52 Nw.U.L. REV. 65, 72-76 (1957); Rey-
nard, supra at 306-313. See also Pollak, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter: Judgment and the Fourteenth Amendment,
67 YALE L.J. 304, 320-21 & n. 105 (1957).
35. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J.).
36. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, (1919);
cf. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, (1919).
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start of the law of the first amendment.- 3 7
And, of course, the development of the im-
portant "void for vagueness" and "over-
breadth" doctrines in this area-"judge-
made" or "judicially-created" remedies
fortissimo--did not come until still later.3 8
The time lag between the adoption of the
Fifth Amendment and the applicability of
the privilege against self-incrimination to
the proceedings in the police station as well
as those in the courtroom was 175 years.39 As
for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it
was not until 19384 0-fairly early in the devel-
opment of constitutional-criminal procedure
but still a quarter of a century later than
Weeks--that "the right to counsel in federal
courts meant more than that a lawyer would
be perinitted to appear for the defendant if
the defendant could afford to hire one."' 4 1
The federal exclusionary rule has also
been disparaged as not derived from "the
explicit requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment," but only "a matter of judicial impli-
cation." 4 2 This does not strike me as much of
a point either-not, at least, unless some-
body can cite even one Supreme Court case
interpreting the Constitution which is not "a
matter of judicial implication."
The most celebrated constitutional-
criminal procedure cases of our times are
Johnson v. Zerbst43 and Gideon v. Wain-
wright,44 requiring appointment of counsel
in all federal and state prosecutions respec-
tively when a defendant is unable to pay for
the services of an attorney. But one searches
37. Kalven, Ernst Freund and the First Amendment
Tradition, 40 U.CHI.L.REv. 235, 236 (1973).
38. See W. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar & J. Choper, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 815-22. St. Paul, Minnesota: West,
4th ed. 1975.
39. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some
Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntariness" Tes 65 MICH.L.REv. 59, 65, 77-83
(1966).
40. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
41. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Proce-
dure, 70 HARV.L.REv. 1, 2 (1956).
42. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). The
point has been made more strongly. See McGarr, The
Exclusionary Rule: An Ill-Conceived and Ineffective
Remedy, 52 J.Crim.L., C.&P.S. 266, 269 (1961), in
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 99, 103.
Chicago: Aldine, Sowle ed. 1961 (Weeks "is a piece of
pure judicial legislation").
43. Seen. 40 supra.
44. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
the language of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments in vain for any mention of
indigent defendants or the assignment or
appointment of counsel at trial-let alone at
preliminary hearings,4 5 at lineups, 46 in the
police station 47 or on appeal48 or in juvenile
court proceedings.
49
The right to counsel has well been called
"the most pervasive right" of an accused, 50
but all the Constitution has to say about it is
that "in all criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall .. . have the Assistance of
Counsel."5 1 That's all. The considerable
body of constitutional law which has emerg-
ed in this important area has all been "a
matter of judicial implication.."52
'Involuntary' confessions
And what is the source of the rule-first
applied in 1936,' 3 but shaped and reshaped
in the course of the following three dec-
ades 54-barring the use of involuntary con-
fessions as a matter of Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process? Talk about judge-made
or judicially-created rules! The Constitu-
tion has nothing to say about "confessions"
or "admissions," neither "involuntary" nor
any other kind.
It will not do to point to the constitutional
prohibition against compelling a person to
45. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
46. Compare United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)
with Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
47. Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
with Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
48. Compare Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) with Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
49. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. See Schaefer, supra n. 41, at 8.
51. U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
52. By "implication," too, the courts have developed
limitations on the exclusionary rule, e.g., standing, the
attenuation of taint from illegal searches, and the use of
illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings or
for impeachment purposes.
These limitations are said to undermine the "'judicial
integrity" rationale of the exclusionary rule. See Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976), discussed in Israel,
Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Legacy
of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1410-12
(1977). The limitations also make the rule "not 'look'
like a constitutional doctrine," according to Kaplan,
supra n. 34, at 1030.
53. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
54. See Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confes-
sion 17 RUTGERs L.REv. 728 (1963).
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Bright
Defendants most
often insist that the
evidence was seized
illegally in cases in-
volving narcotics.
Many defense attor-
neys routinely make
a motion to suppress
such evidence.
be "a witness against himself" in "any crim-
inal case." 55 The privilege was not deemed
applicable to the states until 196456 and by
that time the U.S. Supreme Court had decid-
ed some 30 state confession cases. Moreover,
as noted earlier, even if the privilege against
self-incrimination had been deemed appli-
cable to the states, the law pertaining to
"coerced" or "involuntary" confessions still
would have developed without it.
Until Miranda,57 the prevailing view was
that because police officers lacked legal au-
thority to compel statements, there was no
legal obligation to answer to which a privi-
lege could apply, and thus the privilege did
not extend to the police station. 58 As late as
1966, Chief Justice Roger Traynor pointed
out that although "the Fifth Amendment has
long been the life of the party in judicial or
legislative proceedings .... it has had no
55. U.S. Const. Amend. V.
56. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). "In extend-
ing the privilege against self-incrimination to the states
and at the same time indicating that the privilege has
been the unseen governing principle of the confession
cases, Malloy forcefully brought the Fifth Amendment
to bear on the interrogation problem," W. Schaefer,
THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 16. Evanston: Northwest-
ern University Press, 1967. The "intertwined doc-
trines" (the "voluntariness standard" and the privilege
against self-incrimination), noted Justice Schaefer in a
postscript to his 1966 Rosenthal Lectures, "were fused
in Miranda." Id. at 85 n. 21.
57. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58. See the discussion in Kamisar, supra n. 39, at 65,
77-83.
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life it could call its own in the pre-
arraignment stage." 59
Nor is it a sufficient answer to say that
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process bars
convictions based on inherently untrustwor-
thy evidence (long a universally accepted
view, but, incidentally, not an explicit re-
quirement of the due process clause either).
This does not explain why the question of
the admissibility of an involuntary confes-
sion must be "answered with complete dis-
regard of whether or not petitioner in fact
spoke the truth" 60 and why "a legal standard
which took into account the circumstance of
probable truth or falsity ... is not a permis-
sible standard under the Due Process
Clause." 61 It does not explain why involun-
tary confessions "are inadmissible under the
Due Process Clause even though statements
contained in them may be independently
established as true." 62
Nor does it explain the "rule of automatic
reversal"--the rule formulated by the Stone
and Vinson Courts and reaffirmed by the
Warren Court that the introduction of an
59. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal
Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U.CHI.L.REv. 657,
669 (1966).
60. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).
61. Id. at 543.
62. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)
(relying in large part on rationale of coerced confession
cases to exclude evidence produced by "stomach
pumping").
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involuntary statement at the trial necessi-
tates reversal, regardless of how much un-
tainted evidence remains to support the con-
viction .63
Are confessions different?
Critics of the search and seizure exclusion-
ary rule try to distinguish away the coerced
confession cases, 64 and for good reason. For
once it becomes clear that the rationale of
the coerced confession cases "has been ex-
panded beyond protect[ing] the individual
from conviction on unreliable or untrust-
worthy evidence" to "strik[ing] down police
procedures which in their general applica-
tion appear to the prevailing justices as
imperiling basic individual immunities,- 65
as Professor Francis Allen pointed out a
quarter of a century ago, then it becomes
most difficult to distinguish the problem of
63. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n.1
(1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,404 (1945);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Payne v. Arkansas
356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 621 (1961); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,
518-19 (1963).
Apparently the "rule of automatic reversal" still ap-
plies to "coerced" or "involuntary" confessions, see
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967),
but not to Massiah (Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964) or Miranda violations. See Milton v. Wain-
wright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); United States v. Sanchez,
422 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Jackson,
429 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1970) (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also,
Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of
Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U.CHIL.
REV. 317, 348 (1954).
64. Thus, in criticizing the exclusionary rule as to
unconstitutionally seized materials, Professor Charles
Alan Wright notes, Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free
if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEXAS L.REv 736, 737
(1972): "[W]e are talking only of what lawyers call 'real'
evidence. Involuntary confessions and other evidence
of that kind raise entirely different questions. Innocent
men may give false confessions if sufficient pressure is
put upon them by the police. The murder weapon, the
envelope of narcotics, the gambling slips, however,
speak for themselves." (Don't murder weapons and
narcotics obtained as a result of involuntary confes-
sions "speak for themselves" too?).
See also Wilkey, Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 13
THE PROSECUTOR 124 (1977): "In exclusionary rule
cases involving material evidence there is never any
question of reliability. Reliability is in question, for
example, with a coerced confession .... Exclusion of
evidence is then proper, because the evidence is inher-
ently unreliable."
65. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Fed-
eralism and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL.L.REv. 1, 29(1950).
the admission of unconstitutionally seized
"real" evidence from that of involuntary
confessions. For "[in both situations the
perils arise primarily out of the procedures
employed to acquire the evidence rather
than from dangers of the incompetence of
the evidence so acquired." 66
Although those unhappy with the exclu-
sionary rule still make the claim that the
admissibility of uficonstitutionally seized
"real" evidence and "involuntary" confes-
sions "raise entirely different questions," 67
thd argument comes about 30 years too
late.68
It is interesting to note that at one point
Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court
in the famous Spano case reads like a re-
statement of the reasoning in Weeks and the
Holmes-Brandeis dissents in Olmstead:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involun-
tary confessions does not turn alone on their
inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the
law while enforcing the law; that in the end life
and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to
be criminals as from the actual criminals them-
selves.6 9
66. Id.
67. See n. 64 supra.
68. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), and
companion cases, reversing convictions based on
"involuntary" confessions despite dissenting Justice
Jackson's undisputed assertions that "[c]hecked with
external evidence, [the confessions in each case] are
inherently believable, and were not shaken as to the
truth by anything that occurred at the trial." 338 U.S.
57, 58.
See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-173
(1952): "It has long ceased to be true that due process of
law is heedless of the means by which otherwise
relevant and credible evidence is obtained. This was
not true even before the series of recent cases enforced
the constitutional principle that the states may *not base
convictions upon confessions, however much verified,
obtained by coercion .... To attempt in this case to
distinguish what lawyers call 'real evidence' from ver-
bal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding
coerced confessions."
See generally A. Beisel, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 70-86. Boston: Boston University
Press, 1955; Allen, supra n. 65, at 26-29; Allen, Due
Process and. State Criminal Procedures: Another Look,
48 Nw.U.L.REv. 16, 20-25 (1953); Meltzer, supran. 63,
at 326-29, 343, 347-49; Paulsen, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN.L.REv. 411,
417-23 (1954).
69. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,320-21 (1959).
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One of Justice Frankfurter's last opinions
on the subject-and I confess that I find it
rather mystifying that the author of Wolf
would write this in the same term he dis-
sented in Mapp-perhaps best suggests the
close affinity between the Weeks rule and
the coerced confession rationale. Speaking
for a 7-2 majority, in Rogers v. Richmond,
Frankfurter observed:
Our decisions under [the Fourteenth] Amend-
ment have made clear that convictions following
the admission into evidence of confessions which
are involuntary ... cannot stand. This is so not
because such confessions are unlikely to be true
but because the methods used to extract them
offend an underlying principle in the enforce-
ment of our criminal law: that ours is an accusa-
torial and not an inquisitorial system....
To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be
and have been, to an unascertained extent, found
to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional prin-
ciple of excluding confessions that are not volun-
tary does not rest on this consideration. Indeed,
in many of the cases in which the command of
the Due Process Clause has compelled us to
reverse state convictions involving the use of
confessions obtained by impermissible methods,
independent corroborating evidence left little
doubt of the truth of what the defendant had
confessed....
Since a defendant had been subjected to pres-
sures to which, under our accusatorial system, an
accused should not be subjected, we were con-
strained to find that the procedures leading to his
conviction had failed to afford him that due
process of law which the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees .70
If a conviction rests in part on an indepen-
dently corroborated and concededly truthful
confession (albeit one found to be the prod-
uct of constitutionally impermissible meth-
ods), why cannot the conviction stand? Why
not remand those who have made such con-
fessions, together with those who managed
to remain silent in the face of impermissible
interrogations, "to the remedies of private
action and such protection as the internal
discipline of the police, under the eyes of an
alert public opinion, may afford"? 7' Though
the exclusion of involuntary but verified
confessions may be an effective way of de-
terring objectionable interrogation methods,
why must the court "condemn as falling
below the minimal standards assured by the
70. 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
71. Cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
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Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon
other methods [to deter such conduct]
which, if consistently enforced, would be
equally effective"? 7
2
Moreover, if the impermissible police
methods which produce involuntary confes-
sions are typically more offensive to the
dignity of the individual and more often
characterized by violence than are unconsti-
tutional searches and seizures, are not these
objectionable interrogation methods more
likely to attract the interest of the press,
more likely to arouse community opinion,
more likely to excite the sympathy of jurors?
Why, then, is the court unwilling to rely on
tort actions, criminal prosecutions and inter-
nal police discipline to check impermissible
police interrogation practices? Why does the
"command" of the Due Process Clause
"compel" the court to reverse the convic-
tion? 73 Why can't the conviction stand?7
4
The reason is that to uphold a conviction
resting in part on an involuntary confession,
however much verified, would be to "sanc-
tion" the objectionable methods which pro-
duced it and to afford these methods "the
cloak of law,"' 75 the very insight which the
Weeks Court and Holmes and Brandeis ex-
pressed long ago.
It. The role of the Court
It is not surprising that a majority of the
Court would conclude in 1949, as it did in
Wolf v. Colorado,76 that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not prevent a state court
from admitting evidence obtained by an
72. Cf. Wolf v. Colorado, supra n. 71.
73. Cf. Rogers v. Richmond, quoted in text at n. 70
supra.
74. Id. See also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 339 (1943), where, before putting aside constitu-
tional issues and invoking its supervisory powers over
federal criminal justice, the Court noted, per Frankfurt-
er, J.: "It is true, as the petitioners assert, that a
conviction in the federal courts, the foundation of
which is evidence obtained in disregard of liberties
deemed fundamental by the Constitution, cannot stand.
Boyd v. United States: Weeks v. United States .. "
75. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74
(1952): "Coerced confessions offend the community's
sense of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction [the
'stomach pumping' which produced the morphine
capsules] . . . would be to afford brutality the cloak of
law. Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law
and thereby brutalize the temper of a society.
76. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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unreasonable search and seizure, and that
Justice Frankfurter would write the opinion
of the Court. Frankfurter's, and his breth-
ren's, "notions of the obligations of federal-
ism were a strongly limiting influence on
[their] role in the criminal cases during the
years before the Warren tenure." 77 The Wolf
case "provided an important demonstration
of the Court's essential fidelity to the as-
sumptions of a federal system at a time when
[the Court] was being subjected to extreme
and irresponsible charges of usurpation of
power.."
78
Nevertheless, one is, or ought to be, taken
aback by Frankfurter's reasoning in Wolf:
The protection against unreasonable search
and seizure is "basic to a free society," is
"enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause," but a conviction rest-
ing on evidence obtained in disregard of this
fundamental and constitutionally protected
right can stand-that, if I may be permitted
to quote what I said about the Wolf case 19
years ago, "this is an instance where one
may be ... imprisoned on evidence ob-
tained in violation of due process and yet
not be deprived of life or liberty without due
process of law after all.."7
9
Frankfurter, no less than Justice Day in
Weeks, has assumed elsewhere that permit-
ting evidence obtained in violation of a law
to be made the basis of a conviction would
"stultify the policy" manifested by the law.8 0
77. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The
Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U.ILL.L.F.
518, 526.
78. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A
Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 5.
79. Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Ille-
gal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43
MINN.L.REV. 1083, 1108 (1959).
A decade later, Justice Frankfurter protested that
Wolf did not mean that the substantive scope of the
Fourth Amendment as such applies to the states via
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, that Wolf did not
mean that every search and seizure violative of the
Fourth Amendment would make the same conduct on
the part of the state officials a violation of the Four-
teenth. See his dissent in Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 233, 237-40 (1960).
But most members of the Court did read Wolf this
way. See Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in
Elkins, 364 U.S. at 212-215; and Justice Clark's opinion
for the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-51,
654-56 (1961). For reasons spelled out in Kamisar,
supra at 1101-08, I think the Mapp and Elkins Courts
properly read Wolf as equating the substantive scope of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
And perhaps no jurist since Holmes and
Brandeis has balked as much as Frankfurter
at the courts becoming "accomplices" in
police lawlessness by sustaining a convic-
tion resting on evidence obtained by viola-
tion of law. The cases discussed above in-
volving "involuntary" confessions which
bear the stamp of verity illustrate this point,
at least implicity.
But Frankfurter hfs been more explicit. In
the famous McNabb case, he observed for a
7-1 majority:
A statute [providing that arrestees promptly be
taken before the nearest judicial officer] is expres-
sive of a general legislative policy to which courts
should not be heedless when appropriate situa-
tions call for its application.
* . * Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence
secured through such a flagrant disregard of the
procedure which Congress has commanded can-
not be allowed to stand without making the
courts themselves accomplices in willful disobe-
dience of law. Congress has not explicitly forbid-
den the use of evidence so procured [no more
than did the draftsmen of the Fourth Amend-
ment]. But to permit such evidence to be made
the basis of a conviction in the federal courts
would stultify the policy which Congress has
enacted into law.
... We are not concerned with law enforce-
ment practices except in so far as courts them-
selves become instruments of law enforcement.
We hold only that a decent regard for the duty of
courts as agencies of justice and custodians of
liberty forbids that men should be convicted
upon evidence secured under the circumstances
revealed here. In so doing, we respect the policy
which underlies Congressional legislation.8'
Court inconsistencies
It will not do to dismiss McNabb as an
instance of the Court's exercise of its super-
visory powers over federal criminal justice.
Either courts which permit illegally ob-
tained evidence to be used or allow convic-
tions resting on such evidence to stand "be-
come instruments" of such law enforcement
or they do not. Either the courts' duty "as
agencies of justice and custodians of liber-
ty" forbids that persons should be convicted
upon evidence secured in violation of law or
it does not.
If a federal court cannot allow a convic-
80. See McNabb v. United States, quoted in text at n.
81 infra.
81. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344-47
(1943).
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tion resting on a federal statutory violation
to stand without making itself an "accom-
plice" in the police lawlessness, then how
can any court allow a conviction resting on a
federal constitutional violation to stand? If
permitting the use of evidence secured in
disregard of statutory law -would "stultify
the policy which Congress has enacted into
law," then how can it be maintained that
permitting the use of evidence obtained by
violating the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments does not "stultify the policy"
which the Constitution has enacted into
law?
Nor, as I see it, can the reasoning of the
court, by Frankfurter, in Wolf, be squared
with its reasoning, by Frankfurter, in Ro-
chin8 2 -or with Frankfurter's dissent in
Irvine.8
3
In striking down a conviction resting on
evidence produced by "stomach pumping"
-and certainly the morphine capsules taken
from Rochin's stomach were no less trust-
worthy than the materials seized from
Wolf's office-the Rochin Court, through
Frankfurter, reminded us that "due process
of law" means at least that "convictions
cannot be brought about by methods that
offend 'a sense of justice.' ' ' 84 But don't all
convictions brought about by methods that
offend due process offend "a sense of jus-
tice"?
California did not "affirmatively sanc-
tion" the police misconduct in Rochin any-
more than did Colorado in Wolf. The "stom-
ach pumping," no doubt, was a tort and a
crime. Moreover, as the Rochin Court point-
ed out, the brutal conduct "naturally enough
was condemned by the court whose judg-
ment is before us." 85 Why, then, would
82. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
83. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142 (1954).
The Court affirmed Irvine's conviction for horse-race
bookmaking and related offenses though based on in-
criminating conversations heard through a concealed
microphone illegally installed in petitioner's home.
Justice Jackson wrote the four-man plurality opinion.
Justice Clark concurred in the result, noting that if he
had been on the Court when Wolf was decided, he
would have applied the federal exclusionary rule to the
states. 347 U.S. at 138. Justice Black, joined by Douglas,
J., and Justice Frankfurter, joined by Burton, J., filed
separate dissents.
84. 342 U.S. at 173.
85. Id.
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sustaining the conviction amount to "sanc-
tioning" the police misconduct and "afford-
ing" it "the cloak of law"? And if it would,
why would it not in Wolf?
Nor did the Irvine Court "affirmatively
sanction" the repeated illegal entries into
petitioner's home. Justice Jackson, who
wrote the principal opinion in this case, took
pains to note that "there is no lack of remedy
if an unconstitutional wrong has been done
in this instance without upsetting a justifia-
ble conviction of this common gambler."8 6
Indeed, Jackson went so far as to direct the
clerk of court "to forward a copy of the
record in this case, together with a copy of
this opinion, for attention of the Attorney
General of the United States.."87
Why, then, did Frankfurter dissent in Ir-
vine? Why did he protest that the Court
cannot
* . . dispose of this case by satisfying ourselves
that the defendant's guilt was proven by trust-
worthy evidence and then finding, or devising
other means whereby the police may be discour-
aged from using illegal methods to acquire such
evidence.
* . . If, as in Rochin, '[oin the facts of this case
the conviction of the petitioner has been obtained
by methods that offend the Due Process Clause'
[wasn't this true of Wolf?], it is no answer to say
that the offending policemen and prosecutors
who utilize outrageous methods should be pun-
ished for their misconduct.
That the prosecution in this case, with the
sanction of the courts, flouted a legislatively
declared philosophy against such miscreant con-
duct and made it a policy merely on paper, does
not make the conduct any the less a disregard of
due process.
Of course it is a loss to the community when a
conviction is overturned because the indefensi-
ble means by which it was obtained cannot be
squared with the commands of due process....
But ... [a] sturdy, self-respecting democratic
86. 347 U.S. at 137.
87. Id. at 138. Only Chief Justice Warren joined
Justice Jackson in this regard. The chief justice was
"new on the job"; indeed, his nomination had not yet
been confirmed. In later years he was to recognize that
the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence
"has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct
which produced the evidence." See text at n. 106 infra.
Incidentally, nothing came of the federal investiga-
tion suggested by Justice Jackson, in large part because
the transgressing officers were acting under orders of
the chief of police and with the full knowledge of the
local prosecutor. See Comment, 7 STAN. L.REv. 76, 94
n.75 (1954).
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community should not put up with lawless police
and prosecutors.
88
Reconciling the differences
I can think of only three possible ways to
reconcile Wolf with the majority opinion in
Rochin, the dissents in Irvine and the ration-
ale of the involuntary confession cases.
None of them is satisfactory:
1. Not all violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment offend due process; only certain "out-
rageous" or "aggravated" types of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures do so.
Although even before Mapp v. Ohio and
Ker v. California89 I argued at considerable
length to the contrary, 90 the Wolf opinion
could conceivably have stood for, or have
come to stand for, this limited proposition.9"
But today it is plain that it does not. Al-
though some justices have balked at "incor-
porating" a specific provision of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth "jot-for-jot" and
"bag and baggage," especially in the jury
trial cases, it is now clear that the Court did
not apply a "watered-down" version of the
Fourth Amendment to the states, but rather
one which applies to the same extent it has
been interpreted to apply to the federal
government. 9
2
2. Evidence, verbal or real, which is the
product of police violence or brutality
should be excluded, but not evidence
which is obtained by other types of police
misconduct.
This is the distinction that Justice Jackson
drew in Irvine-and one which he sought to
make even among involuntary confessions.
93
But the court has long recognized that invol-
untariness or coercion need not be based
88. 347 U.S. at 148-149 & n.1 (Emphasis added).
89. 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ("standard of reasonableness
is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments"). See also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
(reading Ker as holding that standard for obtaining a
search warrant is the same).
90. Seen. 79 supra.
91. Id.
92. See generally, Y. Kamisar, J. Grano & J. Haddad,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 12-15. Los Angeles: Center for
Creative Educational Services, 1977; W. Lockhart, Y.
Kamisar & J. Choper, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 577-84.
St. Paul: West, 4th ed. 1975.
93. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1949) (concurring
opinion). See also the comments on Justice Jackson's
views in Paulsen, supra n. 68, at 428.
upon physical violence or the threat of it.94
Why, then, should such violence or the
threat of it be a prerequisite for excluding
other unconstitutionally seized evidence?
Moreover, today virtually everybody
would reject a rule, as did Frankfurter and
the other Irvine dissenters, whether it be a
rule for "real" evidence or for verbal, that
"even the most reprehensible means for se-
curing a conviction will not taint a verdict so
long as the body of the accused was not
touched by State officials." 95
3. Obtaining evidence by searches or sei-
zures that would have violated the Fourth
Amendment if conducted by federal offic-
ers does violate Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process when made by state officers.
But the use of such evidence in state courts
does not offend due process unless the
police methods involved constitute an "ag-
gravated" or "outrageous" or "shocking"
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
This, it seems to me, is the doctrine which
emerges from Frankfurter's majority opin-
ions in Wolf and Rochin and his dissent in
Irvine. I find it a difficult proposition-a
most curious one. Only one step is needed
for "involuntary" confessions-the use of
any confession obtained in violation of due
process offends due process. But two steps
are required for unreasonable searches and
seizures: (1) Did the police violate the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? (2) If
so, by how much? Was it a "gross" violation
or only "mild"? "Flagrant" or "routine"?
The degree of violation
Where does this "two-plimsoll mark due
process" test come from? 96 Talk about judi-
cially created rules of evidence! Where is
94. Thus, the Court threw out the confession in Fikes
v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957), although "concededly,
there was no brutality or physical coercion" and "psy-
chological coercion is by no means manifest." Id. at 200
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954); Spano v. New York 360 U.S. 315
(1959).
95. 374 U.S. at 146.
96. Cf. Frankfurter, J., concurring in Fikes v. Ala-
bama, 352 U.S. 191, 199 (1957): "I cannot escape the
conclusion . . . that in combination [these circumstanc-
es] bring the result below the Plimsoll line of 'due
process.
See Field, Frankerfurter, J., Concurring, 71 HARv.L.
REV. 77 (1957); Kamisar, supra n. 79, at 1121-29.
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this written or even implied in the Constitu-
tion? Next to this test, surely, the Weeks
Court's reading of the Fourth Amendment
and the Mapp Court's reading of the Fourth
and Fourteenth seem like pretty straightfor-
ward interpretations of the Constitution.
To say that police conduct is unconstitu-
tional, that it violates the minimal standards
of due process, is as bad a label as one can
put on police misconduct. How then can it
be said that still more is required for exclu-
sion? Why then must the police be found to
have violated sub-minimal standards?
How does one "barely" or "mildly" vio-
late what is "basic to a free society" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ' ' 97?
If police action which violates due process
is not gross or aggravated police misconduct
per se, then why is it a violation of due
process?
My purpose in comparing the reasoning in
Wolf with that in McNabb, Rochin and other
cases, and with what might be called the
"imperative of judicial integrity" consider-
ation in the confession area, 98 is not to
demonstrate that the Court, or Frankfurter in
particular, has been inconsistent. That is to
be expected; indeed, it is almost inevitable.
After all, Justice Frankfurter sat on the Su-
preme Court for more than 20 years and few
judges who have served half as long have
not been inconsistent.
My purpose rather is to provide "educa-
tion in the obvious": 99 Almost no sensitive
judge can take seriously the implications of
Wolf. Almost no sensitive judge can live
with those implications. At some point he
will not care about or even think about
"alternatives" to the remedy of exclusion-
he will exclude the evidence however logi-
cally relevant and verifiable it be or, if the
court below admitted it, he simply will not
let the conviction stand. At some point he
will be unable to do otherwise.
When that point is reached, he will do
what a majority did in Rochin and some
would have done in Irvine-he will refuse
97. See Allen, supra n. 78, at 9. See also Kamisar,
supra n. 79, at 1121-24.
98. Cf. Elkins v. United States, supra n. 7.
99. Holmes, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 291, 292. New York: Harcourt, 1920.
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"to have a hand in such dirty business. '0 0
This is why the Weeks Court's interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment, Wigmore's fa-
mous criticism to the contrary notwithstand-
ing '0 1, is, if not perfectly logical, quite
understandable-even quite natural.
The Weeks Court believed this point was
reached when the police violated the Fourth
Amendment; the Rochin Court and the Ir-
vine dissenters believed that it was reached
when the police violated some sub-minimal
standard. But the response was the same: We
don't care about possible tort actions or
other possible "alternative remedies"! The
government obtained the conviction by "in-
defensible means." 10 2 We the judges cannot
sanction this. We the judges cannot afford it
"the cloak of law."' 10 3
A judge's threshold
To say that most judges have what might be
called a threshold for excluding trustworthy
evidence is not to deny that the threshold
varies considerably among them-or even
that over the years it may shift significantly
in the mind or heart of an individual judge.
In his decade and a half as Chief Justice
of the United States, for example, Earl War-
ren's threshold for exclusion lowered quite a
bit. In his first year on the Court, he joined
in Justice Jackson's principal opinion in
Irvine, upholding a conviction based on
"incredible" police misconduct but assuring
us that "admission of the evidence does not
exonerate the officers . . . if they have violat-
100. Holmes, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928). As I read Holmes'
dissent, he did not, as many seem to think, regard
wiretapping as inherently "ignoble" or "immoral," but
only wiretapping-or for that matter, any other means
of obtaining evidence by the government-which con-
stituted a specific violation of the law. This was the
"dirty business."
101. See8 J. Wigmore, EVIDENCE §2184 at 35,40 (3d
ed. 1940).
102. See text at n. 88 supra. Are not all unconstitu-
tional means of obtaining evidence to secure a convic-
tion "indefensible"? And if not, why are they unconsti-
tutional?
103. See text at n. 88 supra. If alternative means of
punishing or discouraging governmental lawlessness
are available (at least theoretically), as they were in
Rochin and Irvine, why does admitting the evidence
constitute "put[ting] up with lawless police and prose-
cutors"? And if it does, why did the Court put up with
the governmental lawlessness in Wolf?
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ed defendant's constitutional rights"1 0 4
"there is no lack of remedy if an unconstitu-
tional wrong has been done in this instance
without upsetting [the] conviction."' 10 5
Seven years later, however, the Chief Jus-
tice joined in the opinion for the Court in
Mapp. And another seven years later, very
close to the end of his career, he observed for
the Court in the "stop and frisk" cases:
Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot
and will not be made party to lawless invasions of
the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting
unhindered governmental use of the fruits of
such invasions. Thus in our system evidentiary
rulings provide the context in which the judicial
process of inclusion and exclusion approves
some conduct as comporting with constitutional
guarantees and disapproves other actions by state
agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal
trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of
legitimizing the conduct which produced the
evidence, while an application of the exclusion-
ary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.
... When [unconstitutional] conduct is identi-
fled, it must be condemned by the judiciary and
its fruits must be excluded from evidence in
criminal trials. s0 6
Holmes and Brandeis seem to have had a
consistently low threshold for exclusion. In
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process cases
at least, Justice Jackson appears to have had
a consistently high one. For him unconstitu-
tional police conduct was not enough, not
even serious or aggravated unconstitutional
conduct. It had to involve physical violence
or brutality as well.
That a judge is more likely to give short
shrift to alternatives to the remedy of exclu-
sion in a shocking case of police misconduct
than in a routine one is hardly surprising.
But is it logical? If police misconduct is ever
going to attract the interest of the press,
arouse community opinion and excite the
sympathy of jurors, it is going to do so in the
senational or shocking case (such as Rochin
and Irvine)-not the "routine" or "mild"
unconstitutional search and seizure case
(such as Wolf).
This is why-although his reasoning must
seem curious to many of us who have grown
up with Wolf, Rochin and Irvine-a leading
104. 347 U.S. at 137.
105. Id.
106. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 15 (1968).
proponent of the exclusionary rule main-
tained, some 50 years ago, that infringe-
ments of the Fourth Amendment which gen-
erate the least public outcry pose the strong-
est case for exclusion. 10 7 "The more violent
and obvious infringement," he was willing
to concede, "may be curtailed through civil
or criminal actions against the guilty offic-
ers."lO8
It would be hard to deny that a court's
refusal to permit the use of evidence ob-
tained by "obvious" or "shocking" police
misconduct is, at least in some measure,
symbolic. It signifies to the police officer and
to the general public alike the court's Lin-
willingness to tolerate the underlying police
lawlessness. But if this is true in a case
where the alternative remedies of tort ac-
tions, criminal prosecutions and internal
discipline are most likely to be effective,
how can it be any less so when the court
allows the evidence to be used in a not-so-
shocking case of unconstitutional police
conduct-and thus one where alternatives to
the remedy of exclusion are unlikely, or at
least less likely, to amount to anything?
11L Drawing the 'bottom line'
A court which admits the evidence in such a
case manifests a willingness to tolerate the
unconstitutional conduct which produced
it. How can the police and the citizenry be
expected "to believe that the government
truly meant to forbid the conduct in the first
place"? 0 9 Why should the police or the
public accept the argument that the availa-
bility of alternative remedies permits the
court to admit the evidence without sanc-
tioning the underlying misconduct when the
greater possibility of alternative remedies in
the "flagrant" or "willful" case doi~s not
allow the court to do so?
A court which admits the evidence in a
case involving a "run of the mill" Fourth
Amendment violation demonstrates an in-
107. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained
Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25
COLUM. L.REv. 11, 24 (1925).
108. Id.
109. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Miscon-
duct by the Police, 52 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 255, 258
(1961), in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
87, 90. Chicago: Aldine, Sowle ed. 1962.
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sufficient commitment to the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure. It
demonstrates "the contrast between morali-
ty professed by society and immorality prac-
ticed on its behalf." 110 It signifies that gov-
ernment officials need not always "be sub-
jected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizens.""'
Where should the threshold for exclusion
be put? At what point should a judge say
that the police misconduct is so indefensible
or offensive as to warrant throwing out the
evidence it produced? To say that this point
is not reached until the police have resorted
to violence or brutality or that it is not
reached unless they have perpetrated some
"gross" or "serious" or "aggravated" viola-
tion of the Constitution seems neither a
principled nor a manageable way to go
about it.
If the line must be drawn somewhere, I
110. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 759 (1952).
111. Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 485 (1928).
112. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting)(evidence should not be excluded
when seized by an officer "acting in the good-faith
belief that his conduct comported with existing law and
having reasonable grounds for this [good-faith] be-
lief"); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring in part) (distinguishing between
"flagrantly abusive" Fourth Amendment violations and
"technical" or "good faith" violations);
Also, Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissent-
ing) ("inadvertent" or "honest mistakes" by police
should not be treated in the same way as "deliberate
and flagrant Irvine-type violations of the Fourth
Amendment"); United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443,
451-52 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (officer's
error "so minuscule and pardonable" as to render
exclusion of evidence inappropriate).
See also A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proce-
dure § SS 290.2 (Official Draft, 1975) (evidence shall be
excluded only if violation upon which it was based was
"substantial"; all violations shall be deemed substan-
tial if "gross, wilful and prejudicial to accused"; other-
wise court shall consider, inter alia, "the extent of
deviation from lawful conduct" and "the extent to
which the violation was wilful"); E. Griswold, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 58
(1975) (officer should be supported if he "acted decent-
ly" and "did what you would expect a good, careful,
conscientious police officer to do under the circum-
stances").
If the officer, as Dean Griswold described it, acted in
the manner that "a good, careful, conscientious police
officer" is expected to act, or if, as Judge Friendly
maintained in Soyka, supra, the officer's error was "so
minuscule and pardonable as to render the drastic
sanction of exclusion ... almost grotesquely inappro-
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can think of no more logical and fitting place
to draw it than at unconstitutional police
conduct, however "mild," "honest" or "in-
advertant" some may label it. 1 1 2 Frankfurter
argued that the Court should reverse in
Irvine, although it affirmed the conviction in
Wolf, because the Irvine police misconduct
was more shocking and offensive. But Jack-
son responded: "Actually, the search [in
Wolf] was offensive to the law in the same
respect, if not the same degree, as here.""' 3
I think Jackson was right (but for the
wrong reason). Once the Court identifies the
police action as unconstitutional, that ought
to be the end of the matter. There should be
no "degrees" of "offensiveness" among dif-
ferent varieties of unconstitutional police
conduct. A violation of the Constitution
ought to be the "bottom line." This is where
the Weeks and Mapp Courts drew the line.
This is where it ought to stay. El
priate," then the error should not render the search
or seizure "unreasonable" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment-as the Second Circuit held on
rehearing en banc in Soyka, 394 F.2d 452. After all,
probably cause is supposed to turn on "the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which rea-
sonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act,"
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); and
affidavits are supposed to be interpreted in a "common-
sense" rather than a "hypertechnical" manner, United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).
In light of existing law, the proposals or suggestions
to modify the exclusionary rule must mean that the
challenged evidence should be admissible even when
the officer acted unreasonably, i.e., negligently, so long
as his misconduct was not deliberate or reckless, but
"inadvertent." On this issue (although I disagree with
him on a number of other points) I share Professor
Kaplan's concern:
0 Such a modification of the rule "would put a premium
on the ignorance of the police officer and, more signifi-
cantly, on the department which trains him," Kaplan,
supra n. 34 at 1044;
* "Would add one more factfinding operation, and an
especially difficult one to administer, to those already
required of a lower judiciary which, to be frank, has
hardly been very trustworthy in this area," id. at 1045;
*So long as so many trial judges remain hostile to the
exclusionary rule, "the addition of another especially
subjective factual determination will constitute almost
an open invitation to nullification at the trial court
level," id.
See also Proceedings of 48th Annual Meeting of ALl
374-98 (1971) (debate on Model Pre-Arraignment Code
proposal, supra, to exclude illegally obtained evidence
only when underlying violation was "substantial").
113. 347 U.S. at 133.
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